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L Introduction
Many oil and gas articles have generally addressed the two topics of (1) the rights
of mineral owners' to use the surface estate to explore for and produce oil and gas'
and (2) surface damage statutes This article, however, specifically examines the
interplay between these two doctrines.
Part II of this article provides background information on the historical rights of
surface and mineral estate owners and the development of the accommodation
doctrine. Part III considers how various jurisdictions deal with the inherent conflict
between mineral and surface estates through the use of the accommodation doctrine
and how surface damage provisions change or modify the rights and responsibilities
of the mineral estate owner. Part IV summarizes the findings in Part III. Part V
discusses applications of the accommodation doctrine's "reasonableness" re-

quirement, identifying specific actions by mineral owners that courts have deemed
reasonable and specific actions courts have deemed unreasonable. Part VI discusses
surface damage liability as imposed by clauses in oil and gas leases and by surface
damage statutes. This section identifies states that have adopted surface damage
statutes and explains various aspects of those statutes. Part VII concludes with an
argument that the accommodation doctrine, rather than surface damage statutes,

1. The term "mineral owner" for purposes of this article includes oil and gas lessees and operators.
2. See Richard J. Garcia & Paula K. Manis, Across the Great Divide: Surface Owners v. Severed
Mineral Owners - What Is Reasonable Use?, 78 MICH. B.J. 140 (1999); Morris G. Gray, A New
Appraisalof the Rights of Lessees Under Oil and Gas Leases to Use and Occupy the Surface, 20 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 227 (1975); Paul F. Hultin, Recent Developments in Statutory and Judicial
Accommodation Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1021 (1982);
Charles G. King et al., Surface Rights Issues, STATE BAR OF TEX., ANNUAL OIL, GAS & MIN. L. INST.
§ 9 (1992); John C. Lacy, Conflicting Surface Interests: Shotgun Diplomacy Revisited, 22 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 731 (1976); John S. Lowe, The Easement of the Mineral Estate for Surface Use: An
Analysis of Its Rationale, Status and Prospects, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1 (1993); J. Michael
Morgan & Glen Droegemueller, Accommodation Between Surface Development and Oil and Gas
Drilling, 24 COLO. LAW. 1323 (1995); Guy L. Nevill, Multiple Uses and Conflicting Rights, 13 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 783 (1982); John J. Patton, Recent Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and
Mineral Owners, 18 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19 (1972); David E. Pierce, The Impact of Landowner/Lessor Environmental Risk on Oil and Gas Lessee Rights and Obligations,31 TULSA L.J. 731
(1996); John Erich Johnson, Note, Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness: Colorado'sFurtive Shift Toward
Accommodation in the Surface-Use Debate, 33 TULSA L.J. 943 (1998); Michelle Andrea Wenzel,
Comment, The Model Surface Use Act and Mineral Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements
for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 607 (1993).
3. See Jeanine Feriancek & Cynthia L. McNeill, Oil Company Surface Use: Do Farmers Need
Protection?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'r 28 (Winter 1995); Ronald W. Polston, Surface Rights of
Mineral Owners - What Happens When Judges Make Law and Nobody Listens?, 63 N.D. L. REv. 41
(1987); Davind H.O. Roth, Mineral Instruments and Surface Development: The Past Dominance of
Mineral Rights and Royalty Interests in an Increasingly Urbanized Texas, Cox & Smith Library,
http://www.coxsmith.com/Library/272629.htm (Mar. 10, 2001); Susan Hlywa Topp, Severed Minerals:
Are Surface Owners Entitled to Damages for Diminutionof Their Property Value?, 78 MICH. B. 148
(1999); Steven John Berry, Comment, Surface Damages in Texas: A Proposal for Legislative
Intervention, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 121 (1985); Stacey L. Graus, Comment, Surface Use and Damages
Statutes: 'Cloud'ed Constitutionality6 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 87 (1990).
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provides the most effective solution to the problem of balancing surface and mineral
owners' rights.
II. Rights of the Mineral and Surface Estate Owners and Development
of the Accommodation Doctrine

One of the well-established principles of property law is that land may be
horizontally severed into surface and subsurface estates so that legal title vests in
different owners." Once horizontal severance occurs, a mineral estate is created.!
One of the rights included in the mineral estate is the implied right of the mineral
estate owner to use "so much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary for
operation."6 Conduct is considered reasonable if it is consistent with practices of
the industry.' Provided conduct was reasonable, courts historically placed few
restrictions on the rights of the mineral estate owner and did not balance the
interests of the mineral owner against the interests of the surface owner.'
This implied right of the mineral owner to use the surface has been characterized
as an easement or as a "right of access."9 The use of this easement by the mineral
owner may sometimes be in conflict with the desires of the surface owner.
However, because he has an easement, the mineral owner has the dominant estate,
while the surface owner has the servient estate." Thus, the interests of the mineral
owner have prevailed over the interests of the surface owner when the two interests
conflicted." Recently, however, beginning with the Getty Oil v. Jones" decision
in Texas, courts have placed some limitations on the mineral estate owner's right to

4. Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55,60 (1898)
(stating that "[u]nquestionably at common law the owner of the soil might convey his interest in mineral
beneath the surface without relinquishing his title to the surface," and thereby separating ownership of
the surface from ownership of the subsurface).
5. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. 1943) (stating that a horizontal severance brings
into existence two separate and distinct estates, one of which is the mineral estate).
6. Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (Miss. 1962) (stating that the owner of
a mineral interest has the right to enter, occupy, and make such use of the surface as is reasonably
necessary to produce the minerals); see also Harris v. Curie, 176 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1942) (stating that
the grant or reservation of minerals carries with it the right to use as much of the surface as necessary
to enforce and enjoy the mineral estate conveyed or reserved because a grant or reservation of minerals
would be wholly worthless if the grantee or reserver could not enter the land to explore for and extract
the minerals); Placid Oil Co. v. Lee, 243 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App. 1951) (stating that the owner of a
mineral interest may use as much of the surface as reasonably necessary to produce the minerals).
7. Hunt Oil v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1976) (stating that the reasonableness of the
use of the dominant mineral estate may be measured by the usual, customary, and reasonable practices
in the industry under like circumstances of time, place, and surface estate use); see also Polston, supra
note 3, at 42.
8. King, supra note 2, § 9-2; Polston, supra note 3, at 42.
9. See Bergen Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Barnes, 683 P.2d 365 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); see also
King, supra note 2, § 9-2.
10. Morgan & Droegemueller, supra note 2, at 1323.
I1. Polston, supra note 3, at 42.
12. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
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use the surface,'3 and state legislatures have added their own restrictions in the
form of surface damage statutes. 4
The Getty Oil case was the first to hold that the mineral estate owner's right to
use the surface was not absolute and to create the interplay of rights between the
mineral owner and surface owner known as the accommodation doctrine. 5 The
accommodation doctrine "is a judicial, non-statutory concept [that] requires the
mineral owner to act with prudence and to have due regard for the interests of the
surface owner in exercising his right to use the surface to produce the minerals.'""
This doctrine is sometimes referred to as "due regard" or the doctrine of "alternative
uses."" To date, the accommodation doctrine established in Texas has also become
law in some form in Utah," North Dakota, 9 Arkansas," New Mexico,"' West
Virginia,2 and possibly Colorado" and Wyoming.'
II.Jurisdictions That Have Adopted the Accommodation Doctrine
A. Texas
In Getty Oil, the surface owner, Jones, brought an action to enjoin Getty from
using vertical space above the surface for pumping units that would prevent Jones
from using a center-pivot irrigation system." When Jones purchased the property
in 1955, it was encumbered by an outstanding oil and gas lease owned by several
oil companies, including Getty.' The lease did not specify the type of oil pumps
that could be installed on the land, but it did contain a clause requiring the mineral
owner to bury any pipelines below plow depth." One commentator has suggested

13. King, supra note 2, § 9-2.
14. See 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 530/1 to 530/7 (1993); IND. CODE § 32-5-7-2 (c) (1995); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 353.595 (Michie 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to 82-10-511 (1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 38-11.1 -01 to 38-11.1-10 (1987); 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 318.2 to 318.9 (Supp. 2000); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 45-5A-1 to 45-5A-II (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 60-1-601 to 60-1-608
(1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-7-1 to 22-7-8 (1998); see also infra Part VI.B.
15. John F. Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners: Changes in the DominantlServient
Relationship Between the Mineral and Surface Estates, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-21
(1994).
16. Id; see also Alan V. Hager & Kevin L. Shaw, Idle and Deserted Wells: Who Plugs and Who
Pays?, 45 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 12-28 (1999) (stating that the accommodation doctrine
requires the lessee to consider the rights of the lessor and accommodate the lessor's surface uses if the
uses do not unreasonably interfere with the lessee's operations).
17. See King, supra note 2, § 9-15.
18. See Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).
19. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979).
20. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974).
21. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985).
22. See Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
23. See Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness. 946 P.2d 913 (Colo. 1997).
24. See Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Co., 776 P.2d 736 (Wyo. 1989).
25. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex. 1971).
26. Id. at 620.
27. Id. at 621.
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that this clause could be construed as evidence of intent to allow farming to coexist
with mining."
In 1963, Jones installed a center-pivot irrigation system that could negotiate most
obstacles less than seven feet in height." In 1967, Getty drilled two wells in the
area served by the irrigation system, but the wells could only produce oil if Getty
installed pumping units.' Getty consequently installed two beam-type pumping
units; one was seventeen feet high on its upstroke and the other thirty-four feet high
on its upstroke.3 Due to the height of the pumping units, Jones could not use his
irrigation system effectively. 2 Significantly, two other oil lessees producing on
Jones's property had installed their pumping units in below-ground concrete cellars
so that the vertical obstruction was less than seven feet high, thus permitting Jones
to use the sprinkler system." At trial, Jones claimed that under all of the facts and
circumstances, it was not reasonably necessary for Getty to install pumping units
in a manner that denied him the use of his irrigation system. Getty argued that it
had an exclusive right to superadjacent airspace above the surface area occupied by
its pumps because its mineral estate was the dominant estate.'
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Jones, noting that Getty had reasonable
alternatives for producing the oil, such as using cellars as the other lessees had
done." The court held that
where there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the established
practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the lessee
whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage
of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by the
lessee.'
In so holding, the court assigned the surface owner a right "to an accommodation
between the two estates."37
On rehearing, the court clarified its holding, stressing that the burden of
establishing the unreasonableness of the lessee's surface use is on the surface owner
and that the reasonableness of the surface use is to be determined by a consideration
of the circumstances of both owners." The court reasoned that the reasonableness
of the method and manner of using the mineral estate should be measured by the
usual, customary, and reasonable practices in the industry under like circumstances

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Wenzel, supra note 2, at 632.
Getty, 470 S.W.2d at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
id
Id. at 623.
Id.at 627.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:89

of time, place, and servient estate uses." Further, courts must consider the
condition of the surface itself and the uses then being made by the servient surface
owner in determining reasonableness.'
The court also suggested that the surface owner must first establish that his
proposed use of the surface is the only reasonable means of developing his land."'
Once the surface owner meets this first burden, he must then establish that there are
reasonable alternative methods available to the lessee that will allow the lessee to
produce his wells.' By placing the burden on the surface owner to establish
reasonable alternative methods, the Getty Oil court preserved the dominant nature
of the mineral estate.'3
Therefore, under Getty Oil, the lessor must meet three requirements to invoke the
accommodation doctrine: (1) there must be an existing use of the surface; (2) the
mineral lessee's proposed use of the surface must preclude or impair the existing use
of the surface; and (3) the mineral lessee must have reasonable alternatives
available." Under this test, if there is only one means of surface use by which to
produce the minerals, the mineral owner is not bound by the accommodation
doctrine and may pursue that use regardless of potential damage to the surface. 4'
One year later, the Texas Supreme Court limited the accommodation doctrine in
Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker.' In Whitaker, the owner of severed surface rights farmed
his land by irrigation using a closed and isolated aquifer. The surface owner sued
Sun Oil, the mineral owner, to prevent it from using potable water from the aquifer
in a secondary recovery operation.' While the water used by Sun Oil was from
the only available source of water on the land, " Whitaker argued that purchasing
water from other sources was a reasonable alternative available to Sun Oil.49
Whitaker produced evidence at trial showing that the water taken by Sun Oil would
shorten the life of Whitaker's water supply by 15-20% and that Sun Oil could
purchase and pipe in water for its purposes at economically feasible prices." The

39. Id.
40. Id. at 627-28.
41. Id.; see also Hultin, supra note 2, at 1069.
42. Getty, 470 S.W.2d at 628; see also Welborn, supra note 15, at 22-22 (stating that "the burden
of proof is on the surface owner to prove that the mineral owner has reasonable alternatives and that any
other use of the surface by the surface owner would be impractical and unreasonable").
43. Wenzel, supra note 2, at 632 n.109.
44. Laura H. Burney, Accomnmodating and Condemning Surface and Mineral Estates -

The

Implication of Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement District Number One v. Haupt, Inc.,
STATE BAR OF TEx., ADVANCED OIL, GAs & MIN. L. COURSE, at E-I (1994); see also Garcia & Manis.

supra note 2, at 140.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Getty, 470 S.W.2d at 622.
483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 809.

50. Id. at 810.
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lower court found Sun Oil's use of the water unreasonable, using Getty Oil as the
basis for its decision. 5'
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that Getty Oil is "limited to
situations in which there are reasonable alternative methods that may be employed
by the lessee on the leased premises to accomplish the purposes of the lease.""
The court reasoned that the oil and gas lessee's estate is the dominant estate and the
lessee has an implied grant to freely use as much of the premises as necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the lease. Therefore, the court reasoned, requiring Sun
Oil to purchase water from other sources would be a derogation of the dominant
estate. 3
The court noted that waterflood projects have been held to be reasonably
necessary operations under oil and gas leases and that it was uncontradicted that the
use of water from the aquifer was reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the lease.' Furthermore, efforts by Sun Oil to use available salt water for the
secondary recovery effort had failed, and there was no other source of water on the
leased tract for Sun Oil to use.5 Thus, Whitaker modified Getty Oil by requiring
the surface owner to show that there are reasonable alternatives available on the
leased premises in order to successfully invoke the accommodation doctrine.
In 1993, in Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District No. One v.
Haupt, Inc., 6 the Texas Supreme Court extended the accommodation doctrine to
apply "when [a] governmental entity is the surface owner." In Haupt, the Tarrant
County water district condemned the surface of an eighty-acre tract in order to
construct a reservoir." Haupt was one of the lessees of the tract's mineral estate.
After the reservoir was created, Haupt sued, claiming that the water district had
inversely condemned" its interest in the mineral estate.' The Texas Court of

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 810-12.
Id.at811.
Id.at 812.

56. 854 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993), rev'g 833 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App. 1992), remanded to870 S.W.2d
350 (Tex. App. 1994).
57. Id.at 912.

58. Id.at 911.
59. Inverse condemnation occurs when the actions of a governmental entity result in the taking of
property rights without initiating condemnation proceedings and without paying just compensation as
required by the federal and state constitutions. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY,
§ 9.1, at 519 (2d ed. 1993). The Texas Supreme Court held in 1970 that condemnation of the surface
is not an inverse condemnation of the underlying mineral estate so long as the mineral estate owners
.possess their common law right to the reasonable use of the surface estate." Chambers-Liberty Counties
Navigation Dist. v. Banta, 453 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. 1970). The plaintiffs in Haupt argued that, as a
result of the creation of the reservoir, they no longer possessed the ability to make a reasonable use of
the surface estate because in order to produce oil and gas, directional drilling would be required. Haupt,
854 S.W.2d at 913. The plaintiffs relied on expert testimony that if the court limited the method of
extraction to directional drilling, the value of their mineral interests would be nearly zero. Id.
60. Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 910.
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Appeals held, without considering the accommodation doctrine, that the lessees'
interests had been inversely condemned."
The water district appealed, making the novel argument that the accommodation
doctrine should determine if the interests in the mineral estate had been inversely
condemned.' The Texas Supreme Court delineated the Getty Oil criteria but then
continued by stating:
The accommodation doctrine preserves - absolute and unfettered
the right of the dominant mineral estate to use the surface under certain
-

limited circumstances: Getty recognizes that if there is but one means
of surface use by which to produce the minerals, then the mineral
owner has the right to pursue that use, regardless of surface damage.

On the other hand, if the mineral owner has reasonable alternative uses
of the surface, one of which permits the surface owner to continue to
use the surface in the manner intended (especially when there is only
one reasonable manner in which the surface may be used) and one of
which would preclude that use by the surface owner, the mineral owner
must use the alternative that allows continued use of the surface by the
surface owner.'
Upon remand, the Texas Court of Appeals noted that Getty Oil requires the surface
owner to show that the particular manner of surface use being challenged is not
reasonably necessary to the mineral owner." The surface owner may show this by
proving the mineral owner has available other reasonable means of production that

would not interfere with the surface owner's existing use." However, in addition,
the court of appeals stated that the surface owner must also show that any
alternative uses of the surface, other than the existing use, are impracticable and
unreasonable under all of the circumstances.'

The court further stated that
if a mineral owner has available several means of accessing the
minerals, one of which will maximize the value of the mineral estate
and other alternatives that, if used, will either totally destroy or
significantly reduce its value, the mineral owner cannot rationally argue

that the alternative methods provide reasonable access to the
minerals. 7

6 1. Haupt, Inc. v. Tanant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One, 833 S.W.2d 697,
698 (Tex. App. 1992).
62. Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 912.
63. Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One, 870 S.W.2d 350,
353 (Tex. App. 1994).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 354.
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Several witnesses for both the water district and the mineral owners testified that
creation of the water reservoir made vertical drilling impossible and that only
directional drilling could access the minerals." However, directional drilling would
decrease the value of the minerals by at least 75%.'
Although the court noted that directional drilling is a generally accepted method
of producing oil and gas, the court held that the diminution in value resulting from
directional drilling made it an unreasonable alternative."' Thus, Haupt stands for
the proposition that economic reasonableness is one factor to consider in determining whether an alternative is reasonable. In addition, if there is only one way
to produce the minerals, such as vertical drilling, the mineral owner may pursue that
use regardless of damage to the surface estate.'
B. Utah
Utah also follows the accommodation doctrine. 2 In Flying Diamond Corp. v.
Rust,"' the Utah Supreme Court adopted the accommodation doctrine when it
required a mineral owner to use an alternative means of access to a mineral site. '
The mineral owner and lessee, Flying Diamond, wanted to build a road to access
its oil and gas wells. 7' Rust, the surface owner, requested that the lessee build its
access road from the north to minimize damage to his alfalfa and clover fields.
However, the mineral owner built the road from the east, rendering twenty-one acres
of land unusable for agricultural purposes and causing significant damage to the
surface."6 Rust sued, and the court found that Flying Diamond's construction of the
road from the east was not necessary because it could have built the road from the
north as requested by Rust."
In so finding, the court relied upon Getty Oil and explicitly accepted Texas's
views regarding the accommodation doctrine. The court held "that wherever there
exists separate ownerships of interests in the same land, each should have the right
to the use and enjoyment of his interest in the property to the highest degree
possible, not inconsistent with the rights of others."" In defining the phrase "not
inconsistent with the rights of others," the court explained that a lessee should use
alternative methods to minimize damage to the surface estate. The court also noted
that its holding does not mean that the lessee must use any possible alternative, only

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 353.
See Welborn, supra note 15, at 22-22; Wenzel, supra note 2, at 631.
551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the lessee is required to pursue an alternative that is "reasonable and practical
under the circumstances.""
This language strongly suggests Utah's acceptance of the accommodation doctrine,
yet the court failed to explicitly define the type of parameters that Texas courts have
created to confine the doctrine.' For example, the Utah court did not state which
party must introduce evidence of available alternate uses." Despite the court's
failure to expressly state the requirements needed in order to invoke the accommodation doctrine, Utah has adopted some form the accommodation doctrine. 2
C. North Dakota
In Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh," the North Dakota Supreme Court joined both
Utah and Texas in accepting the accommodation doctrine." Kerbaugh involved
surface owners who sought to prevent the mineral lessees from conducting seismic
operations on the land."'
In adopting the accommodation concept, the court quoted extensively from both
Getty Oil and Flying Diamond, noting that whether the use of the surface estate by
the mineral estate owner is reasonably necessary is a question of fact and that the
burden of proof in such a determination is upon the servient -estate owner.' The
Kerbaugh court cited Getty Oil, stating:
It is important to note . . . the accommodation doctrine is not a
balancing type test weighing the harm or inconvenience to the owner of
one type of interest against the benefit to the other, Rather... the test
is the availability of alternative non-conflicting uses of the two types of
owners. Inconvenience to the surface owner is not the controlling
element where no reasonable alternatives are available to the mineral
owner or lessee. The surface owner must show that under the circumstances, the use of the surface under attack is not reasonably
necessary."
At trial, the surface owners could only prove'that Hunt Oil's seismic testing
disrupted the flow of a spring and that Hunt Oil left open holes on the property."
The surface owners failed to offer any evidence that the mineral lessees had other
reasonable alternatives to seismic testing in exploring the property. Nor did they

79. Id.
80. See Wenzel, supra note 2, at 634-35.
81. Id.
at 635.
82. Id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979).
Id. at 136.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 137.
Id.

88. Id. at 133.
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show that seismic testing was unreasonable.' As a result, the court found for the
mineral estate owners.'
In so finding, North Dakota more clearly adopted a Texas-style accommodation
doctrine than did Utah.9 Whereas the Utah court in Flying Diamond implied which
factors should be considered, the Kerbaugh court expressly stated that "a pure
balancing test is not involved under the accommodation doctrine where no
reasonable alternatives are available."' Thus, because there were no reasonable
alternatives to seismic testing, the Kerbaugh court refused to consider or to balance
the harm done to the surface owners.93 However, the Kerbaugh court did note that
"once alternatives are shown to exist[,j a balancing of the mineral and surface
owner's interest [occurs]."" This balancing process takes into account the different
alternatives available to the mineral owner and weighs them against the inconveniences to the surface owner."
D. Arkansas
When the accommodation doctrine was initially announced, it protected only a
surface owner's existing use." Arkansas's adoption of the accommodation doctrine
extended protection to a surface owner's proposed surface use.' In Diamond
Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips," the surface owners, the Phillips, bought eighty acres
of land upon which they planned to build their retirement home." An order of the
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission designated the Phillips' land as part of a unit for
the purpose of exploring for gas.'" The order provided for one drilling site for
each section within the unit and stated that the site should be located at the
discretion of those who proposed to drill.'"' Before the Phillips had formally
commenced building their home, Diamond Shamrock selected three possible drilling
sites, all of them on the Phillips' eighty-acre tract."'
During the initial process of selecting the eventual drill site, Diamond Shamrock
gave assurances that it would drill a well 160 feet to the north of the intended
homesite' 3 and filed public notices to that effect. But for unspecified reasons,

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 139-40.
Wenzel, supra note 2, at 635.
Hunt, 283 N.W.2d at 137.
Id.; see also Wenzel, supra note 2, at 636.
Hunt, 283 N.W.2d at 137.
Id.
See Getty Oil v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. '1971).
See Wenzel, supra note 2. at 636.
511 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974).
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.

102. Id.
103. id. After the surveying crew placed a stake in the ground and said they "might drill there," the
surface owner protested, saying he did not want an encroachment on the homesite. The head surveyor
"acceded" to the surface owner's request and assured him that the well could be drilled behind the
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Diamond Shamrock ultimately drilled exactly where it promised it would not, on
the precise location where the Phillips intended to build their home."° As a result,
the Phillips could not build their home on the planned location."°
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the mineral owner has the right
to occupy the surface beyond the limits of his well to operate the mineral owner's
estate, the court held that the behavior and use of the surface by Diamond Shamrock
in this instance was unreasonable."
The court based its finding of unreasonableness on Diamond Shamrock's original promise that it would use an
alternative drill site, which remained an available alternative."0 ' In fact, the
alternative drill site was the site suggested by the mineral owner's own geologist."°
In reaching its decision, the court relied on Getty Oil, describing the case as "very
persuasive" and quoting from it the following:
Where there is an existing use [of the surface] by the surface owner
which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the
established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to
the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of the
alternative by the lessee."°
Although the court in Diamond Shamrock never explicitly adopted the accommodation doctrine, the court's quoting of the phrase "reasonable use of the surface"
from the Getty Oil case effectuated an adoption of the doctrine."' Unlike the facts
in Getty Oil, however, there was no existing use of the surface by the surface owner
in Diamond Shamrock. There was merely a proposed use, an intent to build a
house. The court failed to consider this distinction and instead focused on Diamond
Shamrock's previous promises to the Phillips as a basis for its decision. Yet it is
accepted that the accommodation doctrine is law in Arkansas."' Thus, Arkansas
somewhat extended the Getty Oil doctrine and found that even proposed surface
uses are protected by the accommodation doctrine.
E. New Mexico
New Mexico, in the case of Amoco Production Co. v. Carter Farms Co., also
explicitly adopted the accommodation doctrine. In CarterFarms, the surface owner
sued Amoco to recover damages for negligent construction of the drilling site and

several hundred feet away.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 163 (quoting Getty Oil v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971)).
110. Id.
11I.See Wenzel, supra note 2, at 636-37.
112. 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985).

homesite,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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for the alleged willful and wanton refusal by Amoco to restore the surface.' The
surface owner objected to, among other things, the creation of a pit that held drill
cuttings, mud, salt water, and other solids."" The New Mexico Supreme Court
found for Amoco,"' holding that mineral lessees are entitled to use as much of the
surface area as is reasonably necessary, provided they exercise due regard for the
rights of surface owners." 6 However, the court noted that regulations set forth by
the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division required Amoco to construct a reserve
pit and that the creation and use of such a pit was necessary to the drilling
operations. Therefore, the court held that Amoco's actions were not unreasonable.""
Unfortunately, the CarterFarms decision, like Utah's Flying Diamond decision,
provides few parameters to confine the accommodation doctrine. The court's
decision fails to state which party must introduce evidence of available alternate
surface uses and fails to state whether the mineral owner must only accommodate
the surface owner as possible on the leased premises. Regardless of these
shortcomings in the court's opinion, some form of the accommodation doctrine
exists in New Mexico.'
F. West Virginia
West Virginia first adopted and applied the accommodation doctrine in the hardrock mining context. Significantly, West Virginia's accommodation doctrine does
not make a distinction between the extent of the right to use the surface under coal
severance deeds and the right under oil and gas severances."'
In Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin," the West Virginia Supreme Court held that
an 1890 mineral severance impliedly gave the mineral owner the right to construct
a power line on the surface.'' In so holding, the court referred to previous West
Virginia cases holding that any use of the surface by virtue of rights granted in a
mineral deed must be exercised reasonably so as not to unduly burden the surface
owner's use.'" However, the court continued by stating:
A right to surface use will not be implied where it is totally incompatible with the rights of the surface owner .... [W]here implied as
opposed to express rights [to use the surface] are sought, the test of
what is reasonable and necessary becomes more exacting, since the
mineral owner is seeking a right that he claims not by virtue of any

113. Id. at 895.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 896 (citing Getty Oil v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971)).
117. Id. at 896-97.
118. See Wenzel, supra note 2, at 629 n.89.
119. See Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 726 n.4 (W. Va. 1980).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 725-26.
122. Id. at 725 (citing Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633 (W. Va. 1950); Porter v. Mack
Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853 (W. Va. 1909)).
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express language in the mineral severance deed,. but by necessary
implication as a correlative to those rights expressed in the deed. In
order for such a claim to be successful, 'it must be demonstrated not
only that the right is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the
mineral, but also that the right23can be exercised without any substantial
burden to the surface owner.'
This language suggests that West Virginia places the burden upon the mineral owner
to demonstrate reasonable surface use, as opposed to placing the burden on the
surface owner to demonstrate unreasonable surface use or alternative mining
methods."l By placing the burden on mineral owners, the court provided surface
owners with greater protection than the accommodation doctrine may have originally
intended to provide."
With the burden of proving reasonableness on the mineral owner, the surface
estate owner becomes, in effect, the dominant estate." The court cited both
Flying Diamond and Getty Oil as bases for its holding and reasoning;1 2' thus, it
is unclear whether the court actually intended to create surface estate dominance or
if the court merely misunderstood the law it cited.u For example, in Texas, if a
mining easement conflicts with a surface use, the mineral owner may still be
allowed to proceed with its surface use,"' yet the Buffalo Mining court appears to
have overlooked this principle in formulating its rule.' Regardless, an accommodation doctrine of some form exists in West Virginia, a state in which total
destruction of the surface (an activity which could be considered to be a substantial
burden to the surface owner) is commonplace in the mining of coal.
G. Colorado
In Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 3' the Colorado Supreme Court may

have adopted the accommodation doctrine.3 2 However, in so doing, the court

123. Id at 725-26.
124. See Wenzel, supra note 2, at 638.
125. Id.
126. See Clinton W. Smith, Note, Disturbing Surface Rights: What Does 'Reasonably Necessary'
Mean in West Virginia?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 817 (1983) (suggesting that the West Virginia Supreme
Court is equating the due regard theory with an undue burden concept and thus the surface estate is
transformed into the dominant estate).
127. Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 726 (stating that the concept it was defining had been clearly
articulated in oil and gas cases).
128. See Wenzel, supra note 2, at 639 n.147.
129. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d
808 (Tex. 1972); supra notes 25-55.
130. Id.
131. 946 P.2d 913 (Colo. 1997).
132. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 951 (stating that the Gerrity court "allowed some room for
adoption of the accommodation doctrine"); qf COLO. DEP'rOF NATURAL RESOURCES, OVERVIEW OF OIL
AND GAS LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE (2000). at http://www.dnr.state.co.us/cdnr_news/edo/2000105181447.
html (last visited Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter COLORADO LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE] (stating that the judicial
accommodation doctrine exists in Colorado).
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modified the accommodation doctrine by placing the burden on the mineral owner
to prove the reasonableness of his use of the surface, instead of requiring the
owner to establish the unreasonableness of the mineral owner's surface
surface
3
3

use.

In Gerrity, the surface owner, Magness, purchased 1270 acres of land in 1983 to
raise crops and animals. The land was subject to a reservation of the underlying

mineral estate." The owners of the mineral estate, who were not parties to the
litigation, executed an oil and gas lease in 1973, of which Gerrity Oil eventually
became the lessee.3 In 1992, Gerrity Oil notified Magness of its intent to drill
four oil wells on the land, and the parties commenced negotiations to determine the
locations of the wells so as to minimize crop damage and disruption to the livestock
operation." The parties agreed on the location of one well and began drilling on
that well. However, negotiations .eventually broke down over the locations for the
remaining wells, and an agent of Magness informed Gerrity Oil that it did not have
the authority to commence operations on the additional wells. '" With Magness
refusing to allow Gerrity Oil entrance to the property, G-errity Oil filed suit,
requesting that Magness be enjoined from preventing access to the well sites.""
In response, Magness asserted several counterclaims, one of which was trespass.""
The Colorado Supreme Court, noting that each estate owner must have due regard
for the rights of the other in making use of his estate, held that mineral owners
"must accommodate surface owners to the fullest extent possible consistent with
their right to develop the mineral estate."'4 The court continued, stating that
"when the operations of a lessee'.. . would preclude or impair uses by the surface
owner, and when reasonable alternatives are available to the lessee, the doctrine of
reasonable surface use requires the lessee to adopt an alternative means."' In
addition, the court held that when claiming the mineral owner's use of the surface
is unreasonable, the surface owner must initially present evidence that the mineral
owner materially interfered with the surface owner's uses.
While these comments by the court appear to be an adoption of the accommodation doctrine, the court modified the doctrine by shifting the evidentiary
burden.
[T]he operator [or mineral .owner] must [then] present evidence, by
means of expert testimony or otherwise, that explains why its surface
conduct was reasonable and necessary from the perspective of the
operator. This burden properly lies with the operator because the
133. Gerrnty, 946 P.2d at 933. See generally Johnson; supra note 2, at 951.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Gerrity, 946 P.2d at 920.
Id
hi.
Id.
Id.
Id. at.921.

140. Id at 927 (citing Gety Oil v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971)).
141. Id
142. Id. at 933.
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operator is in a much better position, from an evidentiary standpoint, to
explain the necessity of its conduct and to present evidence that its
operations conformed to standard customs and practices in the industry.
Assuming the [mineral owner] presents such evidence, the surface
owner would then be permitted to present its own rebuttal evidence that
reasonable alternatives were available to the operator at the time of the
alleged trespass. Ultimately, it is the province of the trier of fact to
balance the competing interests of the operator and surface owner and
objectively determine whether, under the circumstances, the operator's
surface use was both reasonable and necessary. 3
Thus, the Gerrity court shifted the evidentiary burden from the surface owner, the
party required to prove the unreasonableness of a mineral owner's surface use in the
majority of jurisdictions that have adopted the accommodation doctrine, to the
mineral owner.
In addition, once the mineral owner provides evidence that its use of the surface
was reasonable, the trial court performs a balancing-type analysis that weighs the
parties' competing interests. However, this balancing may not be the same type of
balancing first announced by the Kerbaugh court in North Dakota. While the court
in Kerbaugh balanced the different alternatives available to the mineral owner
against the inconveniences to the surface owner, " the court in Gerrity balanced
the competing interests of the mineral and surface owners to determine if the
mineral owner's use of the surface was reasonable.'45 It appears that under Gerrity,
the trial court is under no obligation to consider whether an alternative available to
the mineral owner, such as directional drilling, which may cost drastically more to
implement in terms of cost and risk, counteracts the surface owner's desire to keep
his land free from vertical drilling so that he may use the land for growing crops.
Thus, a trial court, after balancing the parties' competing interests, could find that
the value in using the surface estate to grow crops outweighs the cost of directional
drilling, thereby requiring the mineral owner to use that method to produce its
minerals. Regardless, Colorado probably has some form of the accommodation
doctrine, although it is drastically modified when compared to the doctrine as
adopted by other jurisdictions.
H. Wyoming
It is unclear if Wyoming has explicitly adopted the accommodation doctrine."
7
However, in Mingo Oil Producersv. Kamp Cattle Corp.,'1
the Wyoming Supreme
Court dealt with a mineral owner's right to use the surface." The mineral and
surface owners had entered into an "access agreement," which required the mineral

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 933-34.
Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 137 (N.D. 1979).
Gerrity, 946 P.2d at 934.
See Wenzel, supra note 2, at 639 n.147.
776 P.2d 736 (Wyo. 1989).
Id. at 736-37.
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owner to (1) pay rentals in order to use the surface and (2) pay for surface
damages.'" After the mineral owner failed to comply with some of the terms of
the "access agreement," the surface owner prevented the mineral owner from
conducting operations on the surface.'" The mineral owner sued, claiming it had
a right to use the surface independent of its 'access agreement" with the surface
owner."'
The court refused to decide if such an "access agreement" was valid; instead, the
court focused on the terms of the original lease agreement entered into by the
parties. The original agreement contained a clause stating that the "[lI]essee shall pay
for damages caused by operations on said land.""' The court concluded that,
under the terms of the lease, the surface owner clearly had the right to be paid for
surface damages.'
More important for purposes of this article, the court, in dicta, reiterated that the
mineral estate was dominant and that under the rule of reasonable necessity, the
mineral lessee is entitled to possess that portion of the surface estate "reasonably
necessary" to the production and storage of the minerals." The court implied that
under an "ordinary" oil and gas lease, payments by the mineral owner for surface
damages are probably not required. To support this position, the court cited Getty
Oil and noted that Texas jurisprudence is not "essentially different" from developed
Wyoming law.'"
One commentator has opined that this statement by the Wyoming Supreme Court
may "represent Wyoming's adoption of the accommodation doctrine, although if so,
the state is using it to provide the surface owner continuing damages from the
mineral owner so long as mineral development persists, rather than requiring the
mineral owner to use alternative mining methods."'" If this is true, Wyoming's
accommodation doctrine functions
more like a surface damage statute than a true
57
accommodation doctrine.
IV. Summary of Existing Case Law on the Accommodation Doctrine
Applying all of the foregoing case law, it is apparent that in the majority of
jurisdictions, the burden of proof is completely on the surface estate owner when
invoking the accommodation doctrine. To summarize, the surface owner must show:
(1) There is an existing use of the surface that the mineral owner is interfering with;
(2) The mineral owner's usage of the surface is unreasonable, as measured by the
usual, customary, and reasonable practices in the industry at the time and under like

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 737.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 741-42.
See Wenzel, supra note 2, at 639 n.141.
Id.
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circumstances; and (3) There are reasonable and practical alternatives available to
the mineral owner in developing the minerals.
Texas, and possibly other jurisdictions, require that the alternatives be on the
leased premises as announced in Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker.' While New Mexico
has not explicitly adopted Utah's position on the accommodation principle, it is
possible that New Mexico would subscribe to Utah's position that the lessee does
not have to use any possible alternative, only that it pursue one that is reasonable
and practical "under the circumstances." 159
The accommodation doctrine will not apply where an oil and gas lease expressly
reserves to the lessee the right to use "all usual, necessary and convenient means"
to explore for and produce oil and gas."w Thus, pursuant to such a reservation, the
mineral owners are under no obligation to accommodate the surface owners in an
existing surface use provided that the mineral owners are using usual means in
conducting their operations.'
V. Application of the Reasonableness Requirement
It should not be difficult for courts to determine whether a mineral owner is
interfering with a surface owner's already existing use of the surface. The surface
estate either is or is not being used when the mineral owner attempts to produce its
minerals. However, the issue of whether the mineral owner's usage of the surface
is unreasonable is less clear and is therefore the subject of much litigation. The
following two sections provide insight into what courts have held to be reasonable
and unreasonable uses of the surface estate.
A. What Has Been Deemed a Reasonable Use of the Surface?
In invoking the accommodation doctrine, surface owners must allege that the use
proposed by the mineral owner is "unreasonable." This requirement may prove
difficult for the surface owner to meet, given what courts have previously deemed
to be a reasonable use. The following section, while not comprehensive, provides
a general overview of what is considered "reasonable" use by mineral owners in
exploring for and producing their minerals.
Although seismographic operations aggravate the surface owner and cause
occasional damage to the surface, they are considered to be a reasonable exercise
of the mineral owner's easement. 2 The construction of roads is also considered

158. 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
159. See Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976).
160. Landreth v. Melendez, 948 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. App. 1997).
161. Id.
162. See Musser Davis Land Co. v. Union Pac. Res., 201 F.3d 561, 568 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the mineral lease granted the lessee the right to prudently conduct reasonable seismic operations as
part of the exclusive and unqualified right to explore for oil and gas); Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp., 182 F.2d
286, 291 (5th Cir. 1950) (holding that an oil and gas lessee under a 1924 lease that made no mention
of geophysical explorations had the implied right to go upon the premises for the purpose of geophysical
explorations); Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979) (stating that the right to
conduct seismic exploration activities may be limited by the accommodation doctrine but allowing
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reasonable even when doing so destroys portions of the surface" through the use
of caliche excavated from the leased premises'" or from the removal, of trees.'"
In addition, the surface may be used in the building of structures, such as a house
for one of the lessee's employees," and facilities, such as pipelines, storage, or
treatment facilities needed for the production and transportation of minerals. "
Texas courts have given wide discretion to operators in their selection of
drillsites. In fact, one early case held that "the lessee [has] the primary and
exclusive right to locate and drill wells wherever he [chooses] in the development
of the premises."'"' Surface owners cannot compel the lessee to use abandoned
well bores instead of drilling new wells,"w nor can they require an operator to drill
in the back yard, instead of the front yard, of a homesite.' 7" Likewise, mineral
estate owners are generally unrestricted in determining when to drill a well"' and
do not have to give advance notice to the surface owner advising when drilling
operations will begin."
Mineral lessees may use both fresh water for mineral exploitation' and salt
water for secondary recovery efforts,' without compensation to the surface
owner."' In addition, disposal of the salt water that has been produced with oil

seismic exploration in the instant case because the surface owner failed to satisfy the burden of proof
placed upon him by the doctrine). But see Oklahoma Seismic Exploration Regulation Act, 52 OKLA.
STAT. §§ 318.21 to 318.23 (Supp. 2000) (requiring a permit to be obtained before conducting seismic
operations and notification of all surface owners where such operations will occur fifteen days prior to
the commencement of operations).
163. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. App. 1958) (holding that a mineral
owner may build roads where necessary for the transportation of heavy machinery and the servicing of
well sites).
164. See B.L. McFarland Drilling Contractor v. Connell, 344 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App. 1961).
165. See Gulf Ref. Co. v. Davis, 80 So. 2d 467 (Miss. 1955).
166. See Livingston v. Indian Terr. Illuminating Oil Co., 91 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1937); Joyner v.
R.H. Dearing & Sons, 134 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App. 1939); Holbrook v. Cont'l Oil Co., 278 P.2d 798
(Wyo. 1955).
167. See At. Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App. 1959) (reasonable use of the
surface includes use of pits, pumps, tanks, and equipment incident to drilling); Grubstake Inv. Ass'n v.
Coyle, 269 S.W. 854 (Tex. App. 1925) (placement of boiler, toolhouse, tanks, and a tent in connection
with drilling operations on the surface was not unreasonable); see also King, supra note 2, § 9-5.
168. Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S.W. 1110, 1112 (Tex. App. 1925).
169. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App. 1958).
170. Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. App. 1919).
171. See generally King, supra note 2, § 9-6.
172. Parker v. Tex. Co., 326 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App. 1959).
173. Russell v. Tex. Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956); Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D.
Mont. 1968); Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Wood, 403 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1966); Sun Oil v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d
808 (Tex. 1972); Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 15 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. App. 1941).
174. See Holt v. Southwest Antioch Sand Unit, 1955 OK 368, 292 P.2d 998; Robinson v. Robbins
Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1973).
175. See generally Robert W. Dace, Oil and Gas: Water and Watercourses: The Right to Use Fresh
Groundwaterin Waterflood Operations,35 OKLA. L. REv. 159 (1982); A. Dan Tarlock, Acquisition of
Water Rightsfor Oil and Gas Development, 34 S.W. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST. 143 (1983); Cynthia
Kay Vaughan, Oklahoma Groundwater Law: When Can Oil Companies Use Fresh Groundwater in
Secondary Oil Recovery?, 24 TULSA L.J. 675 (1989).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:89

or gas through various means has also been held to be a reasonably necessary use
of the surface."7 6 For example, disposal of salt water through the use of reinjection
wells" and slush pits'"" was once common and allowed, although this may now
be restricted due to state environmental regulations."
T

B. What Has Been Deemed an Unreasonable Use of the Surface?
While the previous section demonstrates that courts have given significant
deference to the mineral owner in deciding what is a reasonable exercise of the
surface, courts have occasionally found that the mineral owner has used the surface
in an unreasonable manner. Examples of uses found to be unreasonable include
constructing roads in excess of the reasonable needs of the mineral lessee,"w using
deteriorated and unusable equipment that leaked oil,"' and using portions of the
surface for operations on other premises without authority to do so." 2 Despite the
reluctance of courts to overturn a mineral owner's initial well-site choice, courts in
two instances have held that choosing a location without any regard to the surface
owner's property rights is unreasonable."' 3

176. See generally King, supra note 2, § 9-9.
177. See Colbum v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Co., 842 P.2d 321, 327 (Kan. 1985) (holding that the
granting clause in an oil and gas lease includes the implied covenant to dispose of the salt water
produced during operations by utilizing a salt-water disposal well); TDC Eng'g, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686
S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App. 1985).
178. See Phoenix v. Graham, 110 N.E.2d 669 (i11.1944); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Davis, 80 So. 2d 467
(Miss. 1955); Norum v. Queen City Oil Co., 264 P. 122 (Mont. 1926); Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171
N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1969); Powell Briscoe, Inc. v. Peters, 1954 OK 107, 269 P.2d 787; Acidoil Co. v.
Mitchell, 1942 OK 283, 130 P.2d 993; Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1961); see also William
B. Browder, Accommodation of the Conflicting Interests of the Mineral Owner and the Surface Owner,
25 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 85, 102 (1974); Gray, supra note 2, at 253. But see Thumer v.
Kaufman, 699 P.2d 435 (Kan. 1985) (granting forfeiture of an oil and gas lease when the lessee, in
violation of the express provisions of the lease, used salt-water pits).
179. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-901 (1991) (providing procedures and penalties for unlawful
disposal o'f salt water); TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (West 2000) (severely restricting the use of slush pits
and requiring prior approval from the Texas Railroad Commission before using salt-water reinjection
wells).
180. See Denver Producing & Ref. Co. v. Meeker, 1948 OK 18, 1 3, 188 P.2d 858, 859-60 (holding
an oil and gas lessee liable for building unnecessary roads, causing unnecessary injury to fences,
improperly using the property for pipelines, and failing to bury pipe lines); see also supra notes 75-77.
181. See Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval County Ranch Co., 504 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App. 1973) (issuing
a temporary injunction restraining the pumping, flowing, or production of oil and gas under such
circumstances).
182. See Russell v. Tex. Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956) (finding the lessee of the mineral owner
who used a portion of the surface in connection with operations on adjacent land liable for damages).
183. See Reading & Bates Offshore Drilling Co. v. Jergenson, 453 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App. 1970)
(finding that the lessee's location of its well was an unreasonable use of the premises and that the
location was made willfully, deliberately, and in utter disregard of the surface owner's property rights);
see also supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
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VI. Surface Damage Liability
Clearly, the accommodation doctrine provides little protection for the surface owner
against alleged unreasonable uses of the surface by the mineral owner. Only after the
occurrence of a claimed unreasonable surface use and years of prolonged litigation
does the surface owner have the opportunity to receive compensation for the alleged
injury. As noted previously, successfully proving that a mineral owner's particular
surface use is unreasonable and establishing that available alternatives exist is difficult
for the surface owner. Thus, from the perspective of the surface owner, the
accommodation doctrine creates a very uneven playing field.'" Surface damage
provisions attempt to equalize the respective positions of the mineral and surface estate
owners. Such provisions may impose liability upon the mineral owner for damage
done to the surface under two possible regimes: surface damage clauses within the oil
and gas lease itself and surface damage statutes enacted by state legislatures.
A. Surface Damage Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases
Many modern oil and gas leases contain express provisions obligating the mineral
lessee to compensate the lessor for "all damages caused by [the lessee's] operation to
the surface.'" Obviously, however, these clauses are binding only between the
mineral lessor and his lessee. Thus, if the surface owner is not also the owner of the
mineral estate, such a provision is of little help. Nevertheless, surface damage clauses
can be helpful if the mineral lessor is also the surface owner and, as a result, may
seek compensation from the mineral lessee for surface damages under this theory of
liability.
Although surface damage clauses vary considerably in their provisions, a typical
clause found in a modern oil and gas lease will contain the following language:
"Lessee shall pay for actual damages to growing crops, trees and fences caused by its
operations on said lands."" Some leases may also require the lessee to pay for
damages caused to existing houses and barns."' Other leases may simply contain a
broad surface damage clause specifying that the surface owner shall be compensated
for "all damages to the surface."'"
If surface damage covered by the clause occurs, the surface owner, provided he is
also the lessor, may recover damages in a cause of action based upon the contract."'
184. See COLORADO LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE, supra note 132.
185. See EUGENE KUNTZ ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL
AND GAS LAW - OKLAHOMA LANDOWNER'S OIL AND GAS LEASE 17 (3d ed. West Group 1998).
186. Id.; see also Topp, supra note 3.
187. See KUNTZ ET AL., supra note 185.
188. See Topp, supra note 3. at 148. The following clause is included in some Michigan oil and
gas leases:
Lessee shall pay or agree upon payment to the surface owner, or any person holding under
the owner, for all damages or losses (including the loss of all or part of the surface)
caused directly or indirectly by operations hereunder, whether to growing crops or
buildings, to any person or property, or to other operations.
Id. at 148 n.1.
189. See Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App. 1952) (holding that a surface damage clause
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One of the more common problems with surface damage clauses, however, is
ascertaining the nature of the injuries for which the clause provides compensation."
Typically, the scope of the words "growing crops" within the clause is the subject of
most litigation."" Damages under a surface damage clause involve "application of
normal rules of damages.""' Thus, the measure of damages to a growing crop is the
difference between the damaged crop and the reasonable market value of an
undamaged crop when matured less the cost of cultivating, harvesting, and

marketing."3

B. Surface Damage Statutes
As noted previously, surface damage clauses within the oil and gas lease itself are
of little assistance in affixing liability upon the mineral lessee and providing a method
of compensation to surface owners who are not also the mineral owner."' Thus, in
instances of severed mineral and surface estates, because the surface owner is not a
party to the oil and gas lease, the accommodation doctrine originally provided the sole
means of compensation from mineral owners in cases of damage done to the surface.
However, a growing number of states have enacted a surface damage statute as an
alternative mechanism to the accommodation doctrine to compensate surface owners
for damages caused by the mineral owner.'" In general, surface damage statues have
a threefold purpose: (1) to minimize the harm suffered by the surface estate owners;
(2) to prevent potential loss of the surface that may harm the general public by
depleting available land for agricultural or other beneficial use; and (3) to prevent
unsettled disputes between surface and mineral estate owners from unduly affecting
the mineral development itself." North Dakota was the first state to adopt a surface

creates contractual liability whereby the lessees agree to pay the lessors for injuries to their property
independent of breach of contract or tort liability); see also Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 85 N.W.2d 246
(N.D. 1957) (holding that under such a clause, a plaintiff need not allege or prove injury by defendant).
190. See I HOWARD R. WILLIAMS Lrr AL., OIL AND GAS LAW § 218.11. at 246.9 (2000).
191. See Wohlford v. Am. Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding that native
grasses used for cattle grazing do not come within the meaning of the expression "growing crops" as
used in the surface damage clause of the lease); Trotter v. Wells Petroleum Corp., 732 P.2d 797, 801
(Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that "completely uncultivated and never utilized native grass is not, absent
some contrary indication of the parties' intent, a growing crop"); Holbrook v. Cont'i Oil Co., 278 P.2d
798 (Wyo. 1955) (holding that a surface owner may not recover for injury to native grasses under a
surface damage clause). But see Superior Oil Co. v. Griffen, 1960 OK 249, 116, 357 P.2d 987, 990-91
(holding that lespedeza, bluestem grass, and pecan trees were "growing crops" within the meaning of a
surface damage clause of a lease); Union Producing Co. v. Allen, 297 S.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Tex. App.
1957) (stating that grasses and clover may be viewed as a "growing crop" within the meaning of a
surface damage clause); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 512 (Utah 1976) (holding that
"growing crops" include alfalfa and natural grasses used for grazing).
192. See I WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 190, § 218.11.
193. See Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 1956 OK 248, 301 P.2d 686; Union Producing Co. v. Allen,
297 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App. 1957); see also Texaco Inc. v. Melton, 463 S.W.2d 301, 308 (Ky. 1970)
(providing a set of instructions for use in charging ajury in a surface damage case).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
195. See I WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 190, § 218.14, at 254.
196. See Graus, supra note 3, at 87-88; see also Laura H. Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to
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damage statute."9e To date, eight other states have also adopted such statutes,
including Oklahoma,'

Montana, '

South Dakota,'n West Virginia,"

Tennes-

see,' Illinois,' Indiana,' and Kentucky.' Because the various jurisdictions
have almost identical statutes" and because there are very few reported cases
involving the statutes,' the following discussion focuses on general topics relating
to the statutes with differing states' provisions noted.
1. Legislative Purpose and Interpretation

Surface damage statutes are intended to serve various purposes related to state
goals."'N These goals include using the police power of the state to protect the public
welfare;' protecting the economic well being of individuals engaged in agricultural
production;"' providing just compensation to surface owners for interference with
and injury to their property caused by mineral development; "' and allowing oil and
gas development to coexist with an equal right to use the surface. 2
Surface damage statutes in Indiana, Kentucky, Illinois, and Oklahoma do not
include a legislative purpose within the statute itself. However, one Oklahoma case
announced that the purpose of Oklahoma's surface damage statute"3 is to provide a
mechanism to balance conflicting interests of mineral interest holders and landowners
while recognizing that mineral resources support an important industry of the state.2 '

Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENvTL. L. 1 (1996) (stating that the goal of surface damage statutes is to protect the "economic wellbeing" of surface estates, particularly for agricultural uses).
197. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-11.1-01 to 38-11.1-10 (1987).
198. See 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 318.2 to 318.9 (Supp. 2000).
199. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to 82-10-511 (1999).
200. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 45-5A-I to 45-5A- I1(Michie 1997).
201. See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-7-1 to 22-7-8 (1998).
202. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 60-1-601 to 60-1-608 (1989).
203. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1 to 530nl (2001).
204. See IND. CODE § 32-5-7-2(c) (1995).
205. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 353.595, 353.597 (Michie 2000).
206. In fact, South Dakota's and Montana's surface damage statutes are virtually identical to North
Dakota's surface damage statute. Tennessee's statute is closely related to West Virginia's, while
Kentucky's and Illinois's statutes are exceptionally similar.
207. No reported cases have been found relating to the Kentucky, Illinois, Montana, South Dakota,
or Tennessee surface damage statutes.
208. See Graus, supra note 3, at 87-89.
209. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-01(1) (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-1(1) (Michie
1997).
210. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-501(2)(a) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-01(1) (1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-1(1) (Michie 1997).
211. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-501(2)(c) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-01(3) (1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-1(3) (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-602(b) (1989); W. VA.
CODE § 22-7-1(a)(2) (1998).
212. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-602(b) (1989); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-1(a)(1) (1998).
213. See 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 318.2 to 318.9 (Supp. 2000).
214. See Houck v. Hold Oil Corp., 1993 OK 166, ' 17, 867 P.2d 451, 457; see also Schneberger
v. Apache Corp., 1994 OK 117, 'I 22, 890 P.2d 847, 853; Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 1986 OK 73, 1 18,
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Not surprisingly, surface damage statutes are interpreted to benefit surface owners,
regardless of when or if the mineral estate was separated from the surface estate."'
North Dakota's statute, in particular, provides additional instructions on how the statute
should be construed, stating that the provisions relating to damage payments"" and
notice of drilling operations2 ' must be interpreted to benefit surface owners." '
2. Constitutionality
Surface damage statutes have been held to be a constitutional exercise of a state's
police power.2 9 North Dakota's statute was declared constitutional in Murphy v.
Amoco Production Co.,' a case decided by the Eighth Circuit. Addressing a due
process challenge, the court in Murphy noted that the state legislature declared that it
was using its police power to protect public welfare when it enacted the statute. The
court stated that an exercise of a state's police power is constitutional unless it is
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" of that state." Reasoning that the statute was
intended to protect the state's agricultural and economic status, the court held that the
statute was substantially related to the state's legitimate interests and was thus
constitutional."n
The Murphy court also pointed out that the surface damage statute did not destroy
property rights, such as an easement or "right of access" of the mineral owner; instead,
the statute merely imposed an economic burden on the mineral developer."n This
economic burden, the cost of paying surface damages, effectively protects and
promotes agriculture in that it deters mineral owners from disrupting the surface of
agricultural land.' However, by imposing an economic burden on the mineral
owner, the court recharacterized the parties' relationship from one of property to one
of tort.' Reasoning that no individual has a vested interest in the standards by
which tort liability may be measured,' the court concluded that the statute could
even be applied retroactively.'
M

766 P.2d 1347, 1351-52 (stating that the policy behind the passage of the Surface Damage Act reflected
conservation of the state's natural resources while balancing the interests of oil and gas operators with
those of surface estate owners).
215. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-02 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 45-5A-1(3) (Michie 1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-602(b) (1989); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-1(b)(4) (1998).
216. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987).
217. See id. § 38-11.1-05.
218. See iad § 38-11.1-02.
219. See Feriancek & McNeill, supra note 3. at 29-30.
220. 729 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984).
221. Id. at 555 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
222. Murphy, 729 F.2d at 555; see aLro Graus, supra note 3, at 30.
223. Murphy, 729 F.2d at 555.
224. Id.; see also Polston, supra note 3, at 61.
225. Murphy, 729 F.2d at 557-58; see also Polston, supra note 3, at 59.
226. Murphy, 729 F.2d at 558.
227. Id. at 560.
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The Oklahoma surface damage statute has also been declared constitutional.' In
Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the statute to be
The court
constitutional and awarded actual damages to the surface estate.'
reasoned that the state legislature acted to balance conflicting rights between owners
of different resources and stated that the surface of the land is not a less vital resource
to the State of Oklahoma than the mineral wealth that underlies it. The court
concluded by declaring the act was not an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the
State's regulation of the public welfare.23 The Cloud court also held that because the
statute sets forth a mechanism for determining the amount of actual damages to the
surface estate and that the means selected bears "a real and substantial relation to the
object of balancing
the interests of the various estates," it was not unreasonable in its
application.' 2
Other jurisdictions' statutes have not been constitutionally tested. However, because
the majority of the state legislatures, in enacting the statutes, asserted that the purpose
of the statute was to protect the public welfare and to allow the coexistence of mineral
and surface development,233 much like the North Dakota statute does, it is likely
that they will be found constitutional.
3. Requirements of Mineral and Surface Owners Before Drilling
The majority of surface damage statutes require the mineral owner to provide notice
of the proposed drilling operations to the surface owner." Typically, the mineral
owner must provide written notice at least ten days prior to commencing any activity
on the surface;' however, some statutes do not provide a timeline for when notice
must be given.237 Failure to give the surface owner notice of proposed operations
under North Dakota's statute allows the surface owner to seek punitive and actual
damages." In Oklahoma, provided the surface owner can prove that the mineral
owner willfully failed to give notice, treble damages may be assessed for damage done
to the surface.'

228. See Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 1986 OK 73,1 18, 766 P.2d 1347, 1351-52.
229. 1986 OK 73, 766 P.2d 1347.
230. Id. 1 18, 766 P.2d at 1352.
231. Id. 116, 766 P.2d at 1351.
232. Id. 1 18, 766 P.2d at 1352.
233. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-1(1) (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-602(b)
(1989); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-1(a)(1) (1998).
234. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-01(1) (1987)
235. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/4 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(3) (Michie 2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-503 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-05 (1987); 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.3
(Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 45-5A-5 (Michie 1997).
236. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-503 (1999) (requiring notice to be given no more than ninety
days and no fewer than ten days before the commencement of activity); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-05
(1987) (requiring at least twenty days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-5 (Michie 1997) (requiring at least
thirty days).
237. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/4(a) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(3)(a) (Michie
2000); 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.3 (Supp. 2000).
238. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-05 (1987).
239. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 2000). See generally Houck v. Hold Oil Corp., 1993 OK
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When providing notice of anticipated surface activity, the notice must identify (1)
the location of the proposed entry and the date when drilling operations will commence;'" (2) a copy of the drilling application for the proposed well; " (3) the
name, address, and telephone number of the operator; 2' and (4) an offer to discuss
the amount of surface damages owed to the surface owner." In Kentucky, failure
to include an "offer to discuss" clause in the notice renders the notice deficient."
Some jurisdictions require that a form advising the surface owner of his rights and
options under the surface damage statutes must be provided with the notice as
well."
Within five days after providing notice to the surface owner, Oklahoma requires the
surface owner and operator of the proposed well to begin negotiations to determine
the amount of surface damages owed.' Kentucky and Illinois require negotiations
to occur at least five days before the proposed drilling operations commence, ' while
other states allow negotiations and calculations over surface damages to occur after
drilling operations have transpired.' 4
During negotiations between the surface owner and operator, Kentucky and Illinois
require the parties to discuss the placement of roads, the points of entry for drilling
operations, the construction and placement of pits, the use of surface water, and the
removal of trees.' Oklahoma does not delineate the topics the parties must discuss,
but in the event the parties cannot reach an agreement regarding the amount of
damages owed, the statute provides a method of arbitration. Under this method, each
party selects an appraiser, who in turn selects a third appraiser, and the appraisers

166, 867 P.2d 451.
240. See 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 530/4(c)(1) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(3)(c)(I)
(Michie 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-503 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-05 (1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS 45-5A-5 (Michie 1997).
241. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/4(cX2) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(3)(c)(2)
(Michie 2000).
242. See 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 530/4(c)(3) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(3)(c)(3)
(Michie 2000).
243. See 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 530/4(c)(4) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(3)(c)(4)
(Michie 2000).
244. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 353.595 note (Michie 2000) (stating that "care should be taken
to satisfy the 'offer to discuss' requirement of KY. REv. STAT. ANN. 353.595 (3)(c)(4); if not included
in the required notice, the Department of Mines and Minerals will consider such notice deficient").
245. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-05 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 45-5A-5 (Michie
1997).
246. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.3 (Supp. 2000).
247. See 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 530/4(c)(5) (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(4)(d) (Michie
2000).
248. See IND. CODE § 38-5-7-2(c) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 82-10-503 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-604
(1989); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-3 (1998).
249. See 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 530/5 (2001); Ky. REv. STAT. § 353.595(4) (Michie 2000).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss1/4

2002]

SURFACE USE BY THE MINERAL OWNER

determine the amount of compensation due to the surface owner.'n If the appraisers
determine that no compensation is owed, the surface owner may appeal."'
However, and perhaps most importantly, absent willful misconduct and violation of
the surface damage statutes on the part of the operator,' Oklahoma does not
specifically require that surface damages be paid. Oklahoma only requires that the
parties enter into negotiations.2
Regardless, mineral owners often construe
Oklahoma's statute as creating an obligation to pay for all damages sustained by the
surface owner." If, however, the mineral owner willfully fails to enter into
negotiations with the surface owner, the surface owner may collect treble damages for
the damage done to the surface 2 3"
4. Compensation and Determining Damages
Perhaps the most important provisions of surface damage statutes are those that
discuss the compensation due to the surface owner resulting from mineral exploration
and development operations. The surface owner wants to know how much restitution
he can receive, the mineral owner wants to know how much he is obligated to offer
the surface owner, and both parties want to know the types of surface damages the
statutes cover and for which they provide compensation.
It should be noted that the mineral owner must pay for damages to the surface
regardless of whether or not the mineral owner's use of the surface is reasonable.'
Thus, surface damage statutes, unlike the accommodation doctrine, do not consider
whether a mineral owner's use of the surface is reasonable in determining the liability
of the mineral owner. Under the accommodation doctrine, provided his conduct is
reasonable, the mineral owner can pursue a particular surface use in order to produce
his minerals without regard for liability for surface damage.' Under surface damage

250. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5 (Supp. 2000).
251. See id. § 318.
252. See id. § 318.6.
253. See id. §§ 318.2 to 318.9; see aLvo Polston, supra note 3, at 66.
254. See Polston, supra note 3, at 63-64, 66. In a random survey performed by Professor Polston,
out of forty-seven wells drilled in Oklahoma, the well operators paid or acknowledged liability for
surface damages in all but one of the wells. Id. In addition, when asked for reasons why the operators
acknowledged liability or paid for such damages, one operator simply sent a copy of the Oklahoma
surface damage statutes.
255. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 2000). See generally Houck v. Hold Oil Corp., 1993 OK
166, 867 P.2d 451; Samson Res. Co. v. Cloud, 1991 OK CIV APP 55, 812 P.2d 1378.
256. See 765 ILL COMP. STAT. 530/6 (2001); IND. CODE § 38-5-7-2(c) (1995); KY. REv. STAT. §
353.595(5) (Michie 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-503 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04
(1987); 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5 (Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 45-5A-4, 45-5A-6 (Michie
1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-604 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-3 (1998); see also Feriancek &
McNeill, supra note 3, at 29. But see Houck, 1993 OK 166, IN 14-18, 867 P.2d at 456. The court in
Houck held that in order for surface owners to recover for damage to property caused by the drilling of
a well priorto the effective date of the Surface Damage Act, they must show (I) that the injury to the
surface was caused by some unreasonable conduct on the part of the lessee in conducting oil and gas
operations, or (2) that more of the surface was used than necessary to prudently carry out drilling and
related activities. Id.
257. See Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One, 870 S.W.2d
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statutes, the mineral owner must consider potential surface damage liability when
exploring for and producing the minerals.
At the very least, the mineral owner must compensate the surface owner for loss
of agricultural production and income, lost land value, and lost value to improvements
caused by the drilling operations. " ' North Dakota adds compensation for the lost use
of and access to the surface owner's land.' Indiana obligates the mineral owner to
pay for damages to growing crops,2" and Illinois and Kentucky require compensation
for damage to trees, shrubs, fences, roads, structures, and livestock."' Tennessee and
West Virginia also require the oil and gas developer to compensate the surface owner
for (1) income lost as a result of being unable to dedicate land occupied by the drilling
operations; (2) the market value of crops destroyed, damaged, or prevented from
reaching market; (3) damage to a water supply in use before drilling commenced; (4)
repair of personal property; and (5) the diminished value of the surface after
completion of the well.'
The Oklahoma statute, however, unlike the others, does not specify the types of
damages caused by drilling operations for which the surface owner is to be
compensated and does not provide guidelines for imposing liability.' Thus, the
statute does not indicate when, why, or in what amount the developer is liable for
surface damages.' Nevertheless, Oklahoma courts have held that interference with
a center-pivot irrigation system even on land not actually used in oil and gas drilling
operations is a compensable injury,' while personal injuries' and inconvenience
to landowners resulting from oil and gas drilling on their property are not. 7
When calculating damages in Oklahoma, the diminution in fair market value of the
surface resulting from drilling operations is the proper measure of damages under the
Courts should consider the. following factors when determining the
statute.'
diminution in value: (1) the location of the drilling operations; (2) the quality and
value of the land used or disturbed by the operations; (3) inconvenience suffered in
actual use of the land by the operator; (4) whether the damages are temporary or
permanent in nature; (5) the reduction or denial of access; and (6) the destruction or
loss of native grasses or growing crops caused by drilling operations.' Courts
should not consider these factors as separate items of damage, but should consider the

350, 353
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
3, at 29;
264.
3, at 55.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

(Tex. App. 1994).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997).
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987).
See IND. CODE § 32-5-7-2(c) (1995).
See 765 ILL. COMp. STAT. 530/6 (2001); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(5) (2000).
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-604 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-3(a) (1998).
See 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 318.2 to 318.9 (Supp. 2000); see also Feriancek & McNeill, supra note
Polston, supra note 3, at 55.
See 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 318.2 to 318.9 (Supp. 2000); see also Feriancek & McNeill, supra note
See
See
See
See
See

Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. Smith, 1989 OK 51, 1 10, 771 P.2d 1006, 1008.
Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Heinsohn, 43 F.3d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1994).
Dyco Petroleum Corp., 1989 OK 51, 1 10, 771 P.2d at 1008.
Houck v. Hold Oil Co., 1993 OK 166, 141, 867 P.2d 451, 462.
Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 1986 OK 73, 22, 766 P.2d 1347, 1352.
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total effect they have upon the diminution in value of the surface estate before and
after the drilling operations."
In other jurisdictions, when calculating damages, the surface owner and mineral
owner may devise their own formula for damages to the surface."' However, the
Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota statutes specifically state that when
determining damages, consideration "shall be given to the period of time during which
the loss occurs." 2 Tennessee fails to provide a method of calculating damages;m
however, because its statute is similar to West Virginia's, mineral owners can likely
create a formula with the surface owner to compute damages. While stating that no
punitive damages shall be assessed against the mineral owner, Indiana's statute also
fails to state how surface damages should be measured,27 and there have been no
reported cases dealing with this topic.
If the surface owner finds the operator's measurement and offer of compensation
unacceptable, the surface owner may reject such an offer.2" In addition, the surface
owner may bring an action for compensation in a court of proper jurisdiction for a
determination of the measurement of damages. 6 Oklahoma,2" Tennessee,27" and
West Virginia' provide for arbitration to decide damages calculations." In North

270. See Houck, 1993 OK 166, 1 41, 867 P.2d at 462.
271. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/6 (2001) (providing that compensation may be paid in any
manner mutually agreed upon by the operator and surface owner); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(6)
(Michie 2000) (compensation may be paid in any manner mutually agreed upon by the operator and
surface owner); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504(b) (1999) (amount of damages may be determined by
any formula mutually agreeable between the surface owner and the oil and gas developer or operator);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987) (amount of damages may be determined by any formula mutually
agreeable between the surface owner and the oil and gas developer or operator); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997) (amount of damages may be determined by any formula mutually agreeable
between the surface owner and the oil and gas developer); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-3(a)(1) (1998) (amount
of damages may be determined by any formula mutually agreeable between the surface owner and the
oil and gas developer).
272. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504(b) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS. § 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997).
273. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 60-1-601 to 60-1-608 (1989).
274. See IND. CODE § 32-5-7-2(c) (1995).
275. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/6 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(6) (Michie 2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-507 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-08 (1987); 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5
(Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 60-1-607(a) (1989);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 45-5A-8 (Michie 1997) (requiring the surface owner to accept or reject any offer
made within sixty days); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-6 (1998).
276. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/6 (2001) (stating that the action shall be in the circuit court in
which the lands or the greater part thereof are located on which drilling operations were conducted); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(6) (Michie 2000) (action shall be in the circuit court in which the lands or
the greater part thereof are located on which drilling operations were conducted); MONT. CODE ANN. §
82-10-508 (1999) (district court of the county in which the damage was sustained is the proper court);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997).
277. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5 (Supp. 2000).
278. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-607 (1989).
279. See W. VA. CODE § 22-7-7 (1998).
280. For a brief discussion of Oklahoma's arbitration procedure, see supra notes 250-51 and
accompanying text.
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Dakota and Tennessee, if the amount of compensation awarded by the court or
arbitration panel is greater than that offered by the oil and gas developer, the surface
owner is also awarded attorney's fees, expert witness costs, other legally assessable
costs, and interest from the day drilling was commenced."' Thus, in these two
jurisdictions, it could be to the surface owner's advantage to reject any offer made by
the mineral owner in hopes of obtaining more compensation through arbitration or the
courts.
Payment for surface damages resulting only from exploration is generally given in
one lump sum,m while payment for damages from other operations may be given
in annual installments over time if the surface owner desires. 2"' Under Montana's
statute, failure to pay the annual damage installments within sixty days of receiving
a notice of failure to pay from the surface owner results in the mineral owner paying
twice the amount of the unpaid installment.'
5.Statute of Limitations
Typically, in order to receive compensation from the mineral owner for surface
damages caused by oil and gas operations, the surface owner must give written notice
of the damages sustained to the oil and gas developer within two years after the injury
occurs or after the injury would become apparent to a reasonable person.'
However, Tennessee's statute provides for a three-year statute of limitations.2"
VII. Conclusion
Both the accommodation doctrine and surface damage statutes attempt to balance
the inherent friction between surface and mineral estates, yet they differ in their
approach on how best to resolve the conflict. While the accommodation doctrine
places the judiciary in the position of "second guessing" the reasonableness of the
mineral owner's judgmentw surface damage statutes impart the legislature's
paternalistic, and perhaps patronizing, wisdom upon the agricultural and oil and gas
industries. Such statutes imply that the energy industry is wealthy while those engaged
in agriculture are poor, so that a transfer of wealth is necessary for one party to enjoy
its estate and exercise its rights.

281. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-09 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-607(a) (1989).
282. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504(c) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997).
283. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504(c) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-4 (Michie 1997).
284. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-504 (1999).
285. See id.§ 82-10-506; N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-07 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-5A-7
(Michie 1997); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-5 (1998).
286. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-605 (1989).
287. See Feriancek & McNeill, supra note 3, at 31 (stating that "allowing a third-party to decide
issues retroactively, based on comparative economics (such as whether relocation of production facilities
to minimize disturbance to crops would have been a reasonable accommodation), renders exploration
companies' economic projections futile, or at least uncertain").
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Under the accommodation doctrine, when calculating the potential economic
benefits of a prospect, mineral owners need only consider the costs of exploration,
drilling, and possibly the transportation of the minerals. In contrast, under surface
damage statutes, mineral owners must also consider the costs of compensating the
surface owner for potential surface damages, which directly affect oil companies' profit
margins.' During a period when there is a low domestic supply of oil and gas, it is
unwise to burden the oil and gas industry with additional costs and thus discourage
the exploration of mineral prospects and the drilling of additional wells.
Furthermore, the accommodation doctrine preserves the dominant nature of the
mineral estate, as the burden is on the surface owner to establish that reasonable
alternative methods exist. Yet surface damage statutes invert this relationship, in
essence granting the surface owner the dominant estate. Under such statutes, the
reasonableness of the mineral owner's surface use is no longer considered a relevant
inquiry, and the mineral owner, in compensating the surface owner for damages, is
essentially paying the surface owner for the right to develop his own estate.
Although neither approach is perfect, the accommodation doctrine, even with its
inherent uncertainty over what will be considered a reasonable use, is far superior to
the legislative fiat imposed by surface damage statutes. If a surface owner honestly
believes the mineral owner is making an excessive or unreasonable use of the surface,
then he has access to the courts to air his grievance. But surface damage statutes are
simply a poor economic and legal solution to a conflict that can be better resolved
through the use of the accommodation doctrine.

288. See id.
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